Traffic safety mandates are typically designed to reduce the harmful externalities of risky behaviors. We consider whether motorcycle helmet laws also reduce a beneficial externality by decreasing the supply of viable organ donors. Our central estimates show that organ donations resulting from fatal motor vehicle accidents increase by 10 percent when states repeal helmet laws. Two features of this association suggest that it is causal: first, nearly all of it is concentrated among men, who account for over 90 percent of all motorcyclist deaths, and second, helmet mandates are unrelated to the supply of donors who die in circumstances other than motor vehicle accidents. The estimates imply that every death of a helmetless motorcyclist prevents or delays as many as 0.33 deaths among individuals on organ transplant waiting lists.
Introduction
Empirical evidence consistently shows that motorcyclist deaths are disproportionately concentrated among those riding without a helmet. Based in part on this evidence, helmetless motorcyclists are perceived as a major source of transplantable organs, particularly within the medical trauma community. 1 The perceived link between helmet usage and organ donation even motivated two recently proposed (albeit failed) laws: in 2003, California Assembly Bill 1200
and New Mexico Senate Bill 239 would have made consent for organ donation presumed, rather than based on explicit written authorization, for all helmetless motorcyclists killed in traffic accidents.
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Despite the perception that helmet usage reduces organ donation rates, no previous research has investigated whether such a link exists. Estimates of the strength of this relationship are essential to cost-benefit analyses of government regulation of helmet use. Currently, costbenefit arguments are based on weighing personal freedoms against the negative externalities associated with helmetless motorcycling, including costs to public health programs resulting 1 For example, Trauma.org, an organization of professionals in trauma and critical care, published a discussion about helmet laws that included several references to "donorcycles" and claims by physicians such as " [w] asn't there a study a couple of years ago which showed organ donations went down by a third when motorcycle helmet laws were strickly (sic) enforced?" http://www.trauma.org/archive/archives/helmet.html (accessed February 9, 2010) . 2 For the specific language of the California and New Mexico bills, see http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_1151-1200/ab_1200_cfa_20040109_124839_asm_comm.html and http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/03%20Regular/bills/senate/SB0239.pdf, respectively (accessed February 10, 2010) . Under presumed consent paradigms, motorcyclists can "opt out" of being potential donors only by signing a form explicitly prohibiting their organs for use in transplants. As described by Abadie and Gay (2006) , several European nations currently operate under a presumed consent paradigm.
from the relatively high rates of injury and death among those involved in accidents (GAO 1991) . This study will quantify an additional, unintended cost of government helmet regulation, as measured by its effect on the supply of organ donors.
Using state-and year-specific data on organ donations and variation across states and time in helmet laws, we present evidence that helmet laws reduce organ donation rates.
Statewide helmet mandates are associated with roughly 10 percent reductions in the supply of organ donors who died in motor vehicle accidents (MVAs). In contrast, helmet laws are unrelated to the number of organ donors who died due to circumstances other than MVAs, such as homicide or natural causes. As further support for a causal interpretation of the estimates, helmet laws affect organ donation rates only among men, who account for more than 90 percent of annual motorcyclist fatalities, and are also concentrated among those aged 18 to 34. Our central results suggest that every death prevented by motorcycle helmet laws decreases the number of organ donors by 0.12. Based on this estimate, along with published estimates of the number of organs recovered per donor, each death that occurs among helmetless riders saves the lives of 0.33 persons on the vast organ transplant waiting lists.
In the following section, we review the history of helmet laws and describe the mechanisms by which helmet laws could influence the supply of organ donors. Section 3 describes the organ donation data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and how they relate to publicly available traffic fatality data. Section 4 presents the empirical specifications and results, and Section 5 concludes.
Institutional Details of Helmet Laws and Their Link to Organ Donation
Between 1966 and 1995, the federal government twice implemented and retracted acts that set guidelines requiring all motorcycle riders to wear helmets. Although federal legislation has never been a strict mandate to states, it has induced substantial swings in state-level legislation through explicit threats to cut federal highway funding to noncompliant states. Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, states that enacted both universal helmet laws and seat belt laws would be eligible to receive federal grant money, while states that did not comply would be subject to a 3 percent reallocation of federal highway funds towards highway safety programs. The threat of reallocation was removed with the passage of the National Highway System Designation Act in 1995 (Houston and Richardson, 1995) . 4 For the purposes of this study, partial coverage laws are considered equivalent to having no helmet law due to enforcement difficulties and the high proportion of the riding population facing no restrictions. Although the most common partial coverage law requires helmets for riders under age 18, some states have restrictions for riders under age 15, 19, or 21. A handful of states currently require helmets for operators with instructional permits, less than one year of riding experience, or less than $10,000 of personal injury insurance. All helmet statutes specify maximum punishments for violation; for example, in Georgia, riding without a helmet is punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and one year in jail, but the typical punishment for a first offense is a fine of $90. See http://www.iihs.org/laws/HelmetUseCurrent.aspx for more information on current state helmet laws.
and seat belts, we estimate helmet usage rates in states with a universal law to be 97.8 percent, compared to 54.2 percent in states with partial or no laws. Numerous studies using single-state data also find that helmet usage decreases from nearly 100 percent to roughly 55 percent following universal law repeals (see Berkowitz 1981 , Dare et al. 1978 , Gilbert et al. 2008 , Kraus et al. 1995 , Lund et al. 1991 , Preusser et al. 2000 , Struckman-Johnson 1980 , Ulmer and Northrup 2005 , and Ulmer and Preusser 2003 .
Several additional studies measure the effectiveness of helmets in protecting riders in the event of a crash, with arguably the most convincing approach based on within-vehicle variation in survival and helmet use among operator-passenger pairs. Using this approach, Dee (2009) finds that helmets reduce fatality risk by 34 percent. A related literature considers the effects of helmet laws on state-level fatality rates. Estimates based on within-state variation in helmet laws over time suggest that universal helmet laws reduce per capita fatalities by more than 20 percent relative to partial laws and by 27 to 29 percent compared to having no laws at all (Dee 2009 , Houston and Richardson 2008 , Sass and Zimmerman 2000 .
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The Logistics of Organ Donation Although brain death is rare, occurring in less than 1 percent of all deaths in the U.S., almost all non-living organ donors are brain dead at the time of organ recovery. The crucial distinction between brain death, which involves the irreversible cessation of all brain function, and the more common classification of death (known as "cardiac death") lies in the fact that the heart continues to beat after brain death occurs. Current medical technology allows for essentially indefinite respiration via a ventilator following brain death, so the internal organs 5 A number of additional studies focus on a single state before and after a helmet law change. For examples, see Auman et al. (2002) , Bledsoe et al. (2002) , Bledsoe and Li (2005) , Eberhardt et al. (2008) , Kraus et al. (1994) , Mayrose (2008) , Mertz and Weiss (2008 ), and Muller (2004 .
receive oxygenated blood and remain viable for transplantation. In contrast, organs deteriorate rapidly following cardiac deaths and are therefore unsuitable for transplantation except in extraordinary circumstances. 6 If the brain dead patient is otherwise healthy and provided informed consent for donation, either directly or through family members, surgeons instigate the process of organ recovery.
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The perception that helmetless motorcyclists are prime organ donor candidates is based on the notion that they can be killed in low-speed, relatively minor collisions which cause brain death but leave the rest of the body in pristine condition. In contrast, a deceased helmeted cyclist or automobile occupant is likely to have been in a violent collision that caused widespread internal damage and cardiac death, both of which are incompatible with organ donation.
Although no previous research has documented the effects of helmet laws on brain deaths in particular, the existing evidence linking helmet use to motorcyclist death rates implies that the incidence of brain death is likely to be lower when helmet laws are in place.
The final link between helmet laws and the supply of organs for transplantation involves the transition from brain death to consenting organ donor. Although federal law has always maintained that health care professionals only need the potential donor's consent to recover organs, a practice known as first-person consent, health care professionals typically also seek permission from the potential donor's next-of-kin. Due primarily to low consent rates, donation rates among all potential donors range from 51 to 60 percent according to Howard et al. (2007) .
Despite this apparent inefficiency in organ procurement, policies such as helmet laws that affect 6 An example of such a circumstance is the growing but controversial practice of "non-heart beating donation", in which patients with non-survivable brain injuries (who are not brain dead because they retain some minimal brain stem function) become donors. Donation in such cases entails removing the patient from a ventilator, typically in the operating room. Once the patient's heart stops beating, the physician declares the patient dead and organs are removed. See http://www.organtransplants.org/understanding/death/ for more details. 7 "Otherwise healthy" individuals are defined as those younger than 70 and lacking contraindications to organ donation defined by the International Classification of Diseases. Table 2 of Guandagnoli et al. (2003) lists these contraindications, which include cancer, HIV, hepatitis, and a number of other blood-borne infections.
the incidence of brain death will likely affect the supply of organs for transplantation. In the remainder of this paper, we measure the magnitude of this effect.
Data
The U.S. first established a unified transplantation network, the Organ Procurement Because the MVA category includes donors killed in all motor vehicle accidents, rather than motorcycle accidents in particular, we also use fatality data from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) to refine our analysis. 10 Table 2 percent. Moreover, the dramatic differences across gender contribute to the identification strategy we pursue below.
Do Motorcycle Helmet Laws Reduce Organ Donation Rates?
We next turn to assessing whether helmet laws affect the supply of organ donors. As described above, 38 states headquarter OPOs that report annual data on deceased organ donors.
Our primary empirical strategy involves estimating state-and year-specific organ donation rates as a function of whether the state had a universal mandatory helmet law in place in that year. We begin by estimating the following model:
where Donors st is a measure of the number of deceased organ donors, s indexes the state in which the OPO is located, t indexes the year, and law st is an indicator for whether state s had a universal mandatory helmet law for at least six months in year t. All specifications include a full set of state and year indicators (α s and δ t , respectively), and we indicate below when we also control for time-varying state-level variables X st . The vector X st includes the state's population, its square, and separate measures of the fractions of the population aged 18-34, 35-49, 50-64, and 65 and above; state maximum speed limits; separate indicators for whether the state had primaryenforcement and secondary-enforcement mandatory seat belt laws; climate variables correlated with motorcycle ridership (heating degree days and annual precipitation); and indicators for whether the state had an organ donor registry, whether online registration was available, and whether an OPO in the state enforced a first-person consent paradigm. 11 We weight each observation by the state's population in that year using U.S. Census Bureau estimates. Estimates of γ based on (1) capture the association between within-state variation over time in mandated helmet laws and within-state variation in organ donation rates. (3) and (4) we define Donors st to be the absolute level of organ donors and its natural logarithm, respectively.
These specifications lead to similar inferences as those in columns (1) and (2); specifically, helmet laws are estimated to reduce MVA organ donors by roughly 12.7 percent (= -7.696 / 60.595) when measured in levels and by roughly 9.7 percent when measured in natural logs.
Using donors per capita as the dependent variable, as in columns (1) and (2), allows us to interpret the estimated coefficients as the effect of helmet laws on donors among the population at risk to donate, and provides a straightforward interpretation below when we consider the effect of helmet laws on the excess demand for organs. We therefore focus on specifications using per capita dependent variables from this point forward.
The principal threat to the internal validity of estimates based on specifications such as
(1) stems from differential unmeasured time trends across states in organ donation rates that may be correlated with the presence of helmet laws. These time trends could reflect hospitals improving their procedures for organ recovery, education campaigns encouraging informed consent, or endogenous law changes in response to declining donation rates. If differential trends drive the negative point estimates in the top row of the table, they would likely also induce a negative association between helmet laws and the number of donors due to circumstances other than MVAs. As shown in the "All Others" row of the table, this is not the case -in all four specifications, the point estimates are both positive and statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels. The remaining rows of the table present estimates for the individual circumstances that comprise the aggregate "All Others" category. None of these circumstance-specific organ donation rates is significantly related to helmet laws in any specification.
As Tables 1 and 2 showed above, motorcycle fatalities and MVA donation rates differ substantially across gender, so in Panel A of Table 4 we present gender-specific estimates of the effects of helmet laws. Columns (1), (3), and (5) in the first row show the effect of helmet laws on motorcycle fatalities, given by estimates of γ based on a specification similar to that in (1):
where Deaths st denotes the number of annual motorcycle fatalities per million state residents.
Population-weighted average death rates are shown in brackets. Column (1) shows that universal helmet laws decrease deaths among male motorcyclists by 3.962 per million persons, a 39 percent decline relative to the baseline male death rate of 10.218. Column (3) shows that the absolute effect is much smaller among women, 0.395 per million persons. This reduction is roughly 38 percent of the baseline death rate of 1.039, similar to the relative effect among men.
Column (5) presents estimates of γ based on pooled-gender death rates. The 39 percent reduction (= 4.369 / 11.258) in fatalities is broadly consistent with the findings of Dee (2009), for example, whose estimates range from 27 to 34 percent in specifications using the logarithm of fatalities as a dependent variable. In sum, helmet laws decrease motorcyclist deaths among both genders, but the absolute decrease is much larger among men because men account for over 90 percent of all motorcyclist deaths.
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The gender-specific fatality estimates in Table 4 suggest an intuitive test for whether the association between helmet laws and organ donors is causal -because helmet laws can influence organ donations only through their effect on motorcycle fatalities, the absolute effects of helmet laws on donation rates should be substantially larger among men than among women. We therefore present gender-specific estimates of the effect of helmet laws on MVA donation rates in the even-numbered columns of Table 4 . The results are striking. Helmet laws have large, statistically significant effects on the number of male MVA donors, with the estimate of -0.558 (0.109) being over 16 percent of the baseline male MVA donor rate. In contrast, the estimated effect among women is positive, although the point estimate of 0.015 (0.061) is both practically and statistically insignificant. Although helmet laws reduce motorcycle fatalities among women, the reduction is sufficiently small relative to the number of female MVA deaths that it does not produce a measurable effect on the supply of female organ donors; as Table 2 showed, only 4 percent of all female MVA fatalities in 2007 involved motorcycles, compared to 16 percent among men. We view this pattern as compelling evidence of a causal effect of helmet laws on organ donations, because the most likely sources of unmeasured confounding trends would affect organ donation rates among both men and women. 12 The similarity across gender in relative effect sizes may result from a similarity across gender in the effects of helmet laws on helmet usage. Mayrose (2008) finds that in a sample of fatally injured motorcycle riders and passengers, the effects of statewide helmet mandates on helmet use are roughly constant across gender, with 83.8 percent of males and 85.8 percent of females wearing a helmet in states with a universal helmet law, compared to only 36.4 percent and 34.9 percent in states with a partial law. NOPUS observational data, which are not limited to those who were involved in a fatal accident, do not differentiate by gender, but these data do allow for estimates of helmet usage separately for drivers and passengers. In our analyses of these data, available upon request, the relationship between helmet laws and helmet usage does not significantly differ between drivers and passengers, suggesting that it also does not differ across gender.
As another check on the plausibility of the results shown above, the remaining rows in Panel A present estimates of equations (1) and (2) 14 We also estimated these age-and gender-specific models using total organ donors as a dependent variable, rather than MVA donors. The results of these specifications, available upon request, are broadly similar to those shown in Table 4 , albeit less precisely estimated -total donations among men and those aged 18-34 increase in response to helmet law repeals.
As a final set of specification tests, we next consider the effects of helmet laws on the supply of donors who were killed in accidents that did not involve motor vehicles. As noted 13 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these specifications. 14 We assessed the sensitivity of these central results to four functional form and measurement issues. First, because states enacted or repealed helmet laws in the middle of calendar years (see Appendix Table 1 ), we estimated all models using a measure of the fraction of the year in which a state's helmet law was in place as the key regressor. Second, we treated the dependent variable as a count variable, estimating all models by Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood, and alternatively measured it as the log of per capita death and donor rates. Third, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) six times, each time dropping one of the six states that repealed its helmet law, in order to test the possibility that only one or two states are driving the results. Finally, we excluded from the analysis all DSAs that cover multiple states (such as the Kansas City-based DSA, which covers parts of both Kansas and Missouri) because the state in which a death occurred is ambiguous in these cases. None of these alternative specifications yielded substantively different results from the central ones reported in the text. All alternative results are available upon request.
above, the principal threat to the validity of our central estimates lies in the possibility that statespecific unobserved trends in organ donation rates (or in organ extraction technology) may be correlated with the presence of helmet laws. It is plausible that these changes similarly affect all accident victims, regardless of whether the accidents involved motor vehicles. As a result, we view donors who died in non-motor vehicle accidents (NMVAs) as a more natural "control group" than the full set of donors who were not killed in MVAs (which includes those who died via homicides, suicides, and natural causes, in addition to those who died in NMVAs). Table 5 presents three sets of age-and gender-specific estimates that comprise this final specification test. The first set, in columns (1), (4), and (7), simply reproduces the difference-indifference estimates for MVA donors shown in Table 4 . The second set, in columns (2), (5), and (8), shows the analogous estimates based on specifications in which the dependent variable is the per capita supply of NMVA donors. Finally, the third set of estimates, in columns (3), (6), and (9), is the difference between the first two, representing a triple-difference that identifies the differential effect of helmet mandates on MVA donors relative to NMVA donors. On the whole, the results provide additional support that the central estimates in Table 4 capture real effects of helmet laws. NMVAs are not strongly associated with helmet laws in either the full sample or among those most likely to die in motorcycle accidents, that is, males and those aged 18-34.
Among men aged 18-34, the NMVA estimate is -0.018, compared to -0.526 for the MVA estimate, so the triple-difference estimate is -0.508 (= -0.526 + 0.018). The triple-difference estimates are also negative and statistically significant for males as a whole and in the pooledgender sample of those aged 18-34. In all other age and gender categories, the estimates are sometimes positive, sometimes negative, but always statistically insignificant. Note that the top row of column (9) shows that the triple-difference estimate is not statistically significant in the overall pooled-gender sample, partly because of a smaller point estimate compared to that in column (7) and partly because of decreased precision (the third difference introduces an additional source of noise to the full-sample estimates). Curiously, helmet laws are significantly negatively associated with female NMVA donors aged 35-49, but this finding appears to be an anomaly given that none of the other nine gender-and age-specific estimates are distinguishable from zero.
The estimates in Table 5 also shed light on whether motorcycle helmet laws reduce deaths and organ donations overall or merely shift deaths and donations between circumstances in a form of "crowd out". In particular, risk-lovers who die in motorcycle accidents may have instead pursued other risky activities had their state imposed a universal helmet law. 15 Under this hypothesis, helmet laws would increase the supply of donors who died in NMVAs, leading to ambiguity in the overall effect of laws on the supply of donors who die in all accidents. As Table 5 shows, there is no evidence to support such a crowding out hypothesis: none of the NMVA estimates in the table is positive and significant. Among males aged 18-34, who are at the highest risk of all types of accidents and thus most likely to exhibit crowding out, the estimated effect of helmet laws on NMVAs is actually negative and insignificantly different from zero at -0.018 (0.031).
The Dynamic Effects of Helmet Laws
In order to highlight dynamic patterns that the point estimates in Tables 3-5 states in the former group, the X-axis measures the year relative to the state's law change, with zero denoting the year of the repeal, 1 denoting the following year, and so on. For each state without a law change, "year zero" was randomly generated to equal either 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, or 2003 with equal probability, because these years corresponded to actual law changes in the other group of states. As the figure shows, death rates in the two groups are roughly equal in the three years prior to the repeals, but starting in year zero deaths increase more rapidly in the treatment states than in the control states. By year 4, the death rates in the treatment states are 14.98 per million persons, compared to 11.88 in the control states.
Panel B of the figure shows MVA organ donation rates among men aged 18 to 34, separately for the treatment and control states. The divergence between the two groups of states is consistent with the estimate of γ of -0.526 shown in Table 4 Perhaps surprisingly, Panels A and B imply that helmet law repeals cause gradual increases in both motorcyclist death rates and organ donation rates, rather than discrete changes in the year of the repeal. Panel C illustrates one reason why: per capita motorcycle registrations increase gradually following helmet law repeals. Registration rates increased by 42 percent over the four years following repeals, from 11.7 to 16.6 per thousand state residents. In the control states, registrations increased by 15 percent, reflecting increased ridership in the U.S. in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This pattern implies that at least some of the association between helmet laws and deaths results from an effect of helmet laws on motorcycle ridership. 16 Although speculative, it is also possible that those induced to ride by the repeals are relatively risk-loving or accident-prone compared to those who rode while the laws were in place. In order to assess whether the patterns in Figure 1 are representative of the trends in each of the six treatment states, Appendix Figures 1A-1C show graphs analogous to the three panels of Figure 1 separately for each state. The individual states exhibit patterns that are similar (albeit noisier) to those found in the aggregated treatment group.
The lack of an immediate effect of helmet law repeals on motorcyclist deaths and organ donations may also reflect a gradual effect of repeals on helmet usage. Ulmer and Preusser (2003) show that observed helmet usage declined from 96 percent to 76 percent immediately following the elimination of Kentucky's universal law in 1998, but that usage continued to gradually decline over the next three years, falling to 56 percent in 2001. In contrast, observational studies show that the introduction of helmet laws immediately increases helmet usage from roughly 55 percent to nearly 100 percent (Kraus et al., 1995) .
The asymmetric effects of helmet law repeals and introductions on helmet usage imply corresponding asymmetries in the effects on death rates and organ donations. To illustrate the possibility that behavior responds more quickly to the introduction of helmet laws than to their repeal, Figure 2 shows motorcyclist registration and death rates for Florida, Texas, and California, the three most populous states with helmet law changes after 1990. 17 The top panel shows registration rates in the three states, and the bottom panel shows death rates. Each graph 16 In agreement with the evidence in Figure 1 , models analogous to (2) with per capita registrations as the dependent variable point to large effects of helmet laws on registration rates. The coefficient on law st is -3.317 (0.675), implying that helmet laws decrease registrations by roughly 14 percent of the baseline registration rate of 23.374 per 1000 persons. Similarly, the estimated effects of helmet laws on death rates decrease slightly when the registration rate is included as a regressor, from -4.369 to -3.887. All data on registrations come from the U.S. Department of Transportation; see http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/hss/index.cfm for data from recent years. 17 California is included as a "control" rather than a "treatment" state in our analyses of organ donations because its law change occurred in 1992, before the donation data included circumstance of death. The patterns in Figure 2 imply that the results shown above, which are based on an average of seven years of data following law changes, understate the long-run effects of repeals that gradually influence both registration rates and helmet usage. Moreover, because the timeframe of OPTN data availability covers six repeals and only one introduction, the estimates may understate both the short-and long-run impacts of helmet law introductions.
To further investigate the dynamic impacts of helmet law repeals, we estimated variants of specifications (1) and (2) that include a linear trend in the number of years since a state repealed its law, measured by the variable "years since repeal": Table 4 , which captures the effect at roughly 3.5 years following repeals because it is based on an average of seven years of postrepeal data. Similarly, in models of MVA organ donation rates, the pooled-gender estimates of λ and φ are -0.27 (0.23) and 0.10 (0.05), implying an effect of 0.63 (0.18) at 3.5 years following a repeal. The estimated effect rises to 0.77 (0.21) after 5 years and to 0.98 (0.27) after 7 years.
In order to consider whether the treatment and control states had differential trends in fatalities and organ donations that were not due to variation in helmet laws, we also estimate variants of equation (3) Similarly, the implied effect on MVA donation rates declines from 0.63 to 0.58 (0.24) when state-specific linear trends are included in (3). Although for brevity's sake we do not report the full set of results based on equation (3), these estimates are available upon request.
Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of Motorcyclist Deaths on Organ Donation Rates
The estimates of γ from models (1) and (2) capture the reduced-form relationships between helmet laws and organ donors and between helmet laws and motorcyclist deaths, respectively. As a result, the ratio of the two estimates of γ represents a Wald IV estimate of the effect of motorcyclist death rates on organ donation rates. A causal interpretation of this ratio essentially requires that helmet laws only influence organ donation rates through their effect on motorcyclist deaths. Although we cannot formally test this assumption, the informal evidence presented above suggests that it holds. Specifically, because helmet laws appear unrelated to non-MVA donation rates and to female MVA donation rates, we interpret the estimated ratio as measuring a causal effect of motorcyclist deaths on organ donation rates.
The Wald IV estimates, shown in Panel B of 
where P is the proportion of all MVA fatalities that involve helmetless motorcyclists. The 21 The dramatic shortage of organs has generated a large body of research that evaluates mechanisms for increasing organ donation rates. Abadie and Gay (2006) find that countries using presumed consent donation standards have 25 to 30 percent higher donation rates than observationally similar countries using informed consent regimes. In a special issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives addressing the excess demand for organs, Becker and Elias (2007) focus on financial incentives for increasing living donors, Howard (2007) reviews policies for increasing consent rates and the pool of potential donors, and Roth (2007) discusses the compensation of organ donors in light of "repugnance" for the market trading of organs. In a series of papers, Roth, Sonmez, and Unver (2004, 2005) design a matching mechanism for organ recipients and donors that has been implemented in New England.
deaths, helmet usage rates in states without universal laws suggest that nearly half of all motorcyclists prefer to ride helmetless. Helmet mandates impose costs on these riders, but these costs may be justified by a reduction in the negative externalities imposed by those injured or killed in accidents.
This study is the first to assess the anecdotal belief that helmet laws also decrease the positive externalities of helmetless riding by reducing the supply of organ donors. Our central estimates show that organ donations due to motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) increase by 10 percent when states repeal helmet laws. Nearly all of this effect is concentrated among men, who account for over 90 percent of motorcyclist fatalities, and it is also concentrated among those aged 18 to 34. Helmet laws are unrelated to the number of organ donors who died in circumstances other than MVAs, providing further support for a causal interpretation of the association between helmet laws and MVA donors. Under the upper-bound assumption that each recovered organ saves one life, the estimates imply that every motorcyclist death due to the lack of a helmet law saves the lives of 0.33 individuals on organ transplant waiting lists.
Quantifying the unintended consequences of helmet laws allows for more informed policymaking by providing a more complete picture of the associated costs and benefits. Based on our preferred estimates, 3.1 to 4.6 percent of those who died while awaiting an organ in 2007
would have instead received a transplant if all helmet laws were repealed. These estimates may understate the long-run impacts of helmet laws on organ donations, but they show that helmet laws profoundly affect the lives of some potential transplant recipients. This unintended consequence merits consideration in cost-benefit analyses of helmet laws, which currently focus on weighing the costs to society of helmetless motorcycling against motorcyclists' freedom of choice. 2) Models in column (2) add controls for the state maximum speed limit, quadratics in the total population of the state, the age distribution of the state's population, heating degree days, annual precipitation, and indicators for whether the state has a donor registry, whether the state allows online donor registration, whether organs can be donated without the consent of family members of the prospective donor, and whether the state had primary enforcement of seat belt laws.
3) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering within state over time. 2) All models include the state-year controls described in the notes to 2) All models include the state-year controls described in the notes to Table 3. 3) Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering within state over time. 
